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ABSTRACT 
The Hatch–Waxman Act delineates a pathway for the approval 
of generic drugs by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In 
addition to an abbreviated generic drug approval process, the 
Hatch–Waxman Act added a new defense to patent infringement, a 
statutory experimental use exception. The statutory experimental use 
exception allows pharmaceutical companies to conduct research on 
patented technologies if the research might be used in a regulatory 
submission to the FDA.  
In a separate article, I argued that the statutory experimental 
use exception should apply to the agricultural biotechnology 
industry’s development of genetically engineered crops. Arguments 
were based on the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the 
underlying statute and the FDA’s regulation of genetically 
engineered (GE) crops. Such an application of the experimental use 
exception would have a potentially large impact on the patent 
valuations within the agricultural biotechnology industry.  
This Article describes the limitations of the statutory 
experimental use exception of the Hatch–Waxman Act in light of the 
patent strategies employed by the agricultural biotechnology 
industry. Based on these limitations, this Article argues that 
intellectual property protection is still valuable to agricultural 
biotechnology companies if the statutory experimental use defense 
were available to the industry. Part I describes the development of 
the statutory experimental use exception and its evolution. Part II 
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explains the intellectual property protection necessary for the 
agricultural biotechnology industry due to the regulations and long 
development timelines. Part III analyzes the case law surrounding 
the statutory experimental use exception in light of GE crop 
intellectual property protection to describe the reach of the statutory 
experimental use exception within the industry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Company (DuPont) and 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Pioneer) attempted to invoke the 
Hatch–Waxman statutory experimental use exception defense 
against claims of patent infringement in litigation against Monsanto 
Company and Monsanto Technology, LLC (Monsanto).1 The 
statutory experimental use exception exempts certain uses of 
patented inventions from infringement liability— specifically, uses 
in research conducted on inventions in order to gain approval by the 
                                                
1. Monsanto Co. & Monsanto Tech., LLC v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00686-ERW (E.D. Mo. June 29, 2012) 
(PACER). 
 Defining Limits 511 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).2 The court in the Monsanto 
case refused to apply the defense to the agricultural biotechnology 
industry. As a result, instead of a judgment of noninfringement, 
Monsanto received a one-billion-dollar award based on Monsanto’s 
evidence of the reasonable royalty it might have charged in order to 
conduct research using its patented technology.3 
The one-billion-dollar award reflects the value of Monsanto-
owned patents named in the suit. Monsanto is one of the largest 
agricultural biotechnology companies in the world; it develops and 
produces genetically engineered (GE) crops, among other products. 
As such, Monsanto relies on a variety of patents protecting all 
possible aspects of its products and development program. The high 
valuation on the patents for research alone should illustrate why 
Monsanto would be against the application of the statutory 
experimental use exception in the agricultural biotechnology 
industry. Monsanto likely—and rightly—fears that its patents would 
be less valuable if it could not enforce them against competitors 
conducting research on Monsanto inventions. Application of the 
statutory experimental use exception would limit patent infringement 
liability of competitors for such acts.  
The Hatch–Waxman Act delineates a pathway for the approval 
of generic drugs by the FDA.4 In addition to an abbreviated generic 
drug approval process, the Hatch–Waxman Act added a new defense 
to patent infringement, a statutory experimental use exception. The 
statutory experimental use exception allows pharmaceutical 
companies to conduct research on patented technologies if the 
research might be used in a regulatory submission to the FDA.5 
This Hatch–Waxman statutory experimental use exception has 
been expanded from its initial use in the development of generic 
drugs to include a variety of other uses in the pharmaceutical 
industry.6 In a separate article, I argue for the applicability of the 
                                                 
 2. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, § 202(e)(1), 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).  
 3. Transcript of Record at 255, Monsanto Co. & Monsanto Tech., LLC v. 
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00686-ERW 
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2012) (No. 1581), 2012 WL 8438518. 
 4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). In 2003, Congress amended this scheme 
in Title XI of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1101-18, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-64 (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 355 (2012)). 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 6. See infra Section I.B.  
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statutory experimental use exception to the agricultural 
biotechnology industry in light of that industry’s reliance on patent 
protection for GE crops.7  
This Article describes the limitations of the statutory 
experimental use exception of the Hatch–Waxman Act in light of the 
tri-agency regulatory scheme and the patent strategies employed by 
the agricultural biotechnology industry. Based on these limitations, 
this Article argues that intellectual property protection would still be 
valuable to agricultural biotechnology companies if the statutory 
experimental use defense were available to the industry. Part I 
describes the development of the statutory experimental use 
exception and its evolution. Part II explains the intellectual property 
protection necessary for the agricultural biotechnology industry due 
to the regulations and long development timelines. Part III analyzes 
the limitations on the applicability of the statutory experimental use 
exception based on intellectual property protection strategies and the 
multi-agency regulation approach to describe the reach of the 
statutory experimental use exception within the industry.  
 I.THE STATUTORY EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION  
The statutory experimental use exception developed out of the 
gap left by the death of the common law experimental use exception 
and the need for better access to generic versions of drugs. Since its 
enactment, the application of the statutory experimental use 
exception has evolved to cover more than merely generic drugs. 
However, the coverage is not absolute.  
A. Creation of a Statutory Experimental Use Exception 
Well before the creation of the statutory experimental use 
exception, a common law experimental use exception arose and was 
abolished. As early as 1813, judges read the patent system to include 
a common law experimental use exception to infringement liability. 
The seminal case is that of Whittemore v. Cutter, in which Justice 
Story established the experimental use exception as a defense to 
patent infringement if the infringement occurred during the process 
                                                 
 7. Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Ritalin to Roundup: Expanding the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Statutory Experimental Use Exception to Agriculture, U. 
CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter “Ritalin to RoundUp”]. 
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of scientific research.8 This common law experimental use exception 
evolved to encompass uses in which the invention was not made for 
profit, including the use of a patented invention in order to improve 
it9 and to procure an improvement patent.10 
Courts began limiting the common law experimental use 
exception in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the commercial 
interests of the patent owner became more important to the analysis. 
First fell the use of a patented invention to develop a new product in 
Pitcairn v. United States11 and Roche Products v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co. Then, the Federal Circuit held that any 
commercial purpose disallowed the common law experimental use 
exception even if no product developed from the research.12 Finally, 
the Federal Circuit held that the non-profit or commercial status of 
an accused infringer did not matter as long as the infringing activity 
furthered a legitimate business interest.13 
Interestingly, the Roche decision dealt with the development of 
generic drugs. In Roche, a generic drug manufacturer used a patented 
drug to perform experiments for submission to the FDA once the 
patents had expired.14 It was largely in response to the Roche 
decision that the Hatch–Waxman statutory experimental use 
exception developed.  
As the application of the common law experimental use 
exception contracted, the healthcare industry evolved to comply with 
an increasingly complex regulatory structure. At the same time, 
consumers expected cheaper, non-patent protected, i.e., generic, 
versions of drugs to become available as patents on drugs expired. 
Patent protection allows the patent owner the right to exclude 
others from using the product. In an industry with a long regulatory 
pathway, such as the pharmaceutical industry, this translates into 
delays in bringing generic drugs to the marketplace and thus an 
artificial extension of the patent term. Because patents prohibit new 
entrants into a product marketplace until after expiration, the 
                                                 
 8. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1120-23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) 
(No. 17,600). 
 9. Swain v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391). 
 10. Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 375 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 
 11. Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1126 (Ct. Cl. 1976).  
 12. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
 13. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
 14. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
514 Michigan State Law Review  2015:509 
increased regulations concerned consumers due to the delayed entry 
of cheaper generics—delays exacerbated by patent extensions for 
delays in regulatory approval. In response, Congress developed an 
abbreviated approval pathway for generic drugs, including the 
statutory experimental use exception.15 
The regulation of drugs has only become more stringent over 
time. It was only in 1962 that Congress amended the Food Drug and 
Cosmetics Act (FDCA) to require companies to submit proof of the 
drug’s safety and efficacy for the marketed indication.16 Prior to that 
time, formulation safety was the primary concern.17  
Today, the regulatory process for FDA approval of new drugs 
is relatively straightforward, but highly expensive and uncertain. 
After testing the new drug on animals,18 the company begins human 
testing in clinical trials to determine the safety and efficacy of the 
drug.19 The resulting data from the three-phased clinical trials is the 
basis for the evaluation of the drug.20 Generally, if a drug’s proposed 
benefits outweigh its known risks, the drug will be approved for 
sale.21 
These increased safety and efficacy standards have increased 
the cost of drug development. The testing protocols and regulations 
required to comply with the FDCA cost millions of dollars.22 Since 
close to 90% of drugs in the clinical trial pipeline ultimately fail to 
                                                 
 15. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 16. John P. Swann, FDA’s Origin and Functions: Part III, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ 
ucm055118.htm (last updated June 18, 2009). 
 17. For a general history of the development of the FDA, see John P. 
Swann, FDA’s Origin, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm124403.htm (last updated June 23, 2014). 
 18. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, How FDA Evaluates Regulated 
Products: Drugs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm269834.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2012). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. The FDA, at this stage, has sixty days to decide to approve and file 
an application or not. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE DRUG REVIEW PROCESS 1, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ 
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/UCM195671.pdf. 
 22. This number is highly disputed. Some studies range from approximately 
one hundred million to eight hundred million or more. MERRILL GOOZNER, $800 
MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS 237, 239 (2004). But 
these studies often include capitalized costs of failed drug leads as well as 
opportunity costs. Id. at 10. 
 Defining Limits 515 
gain FDA approval,23 pharmaceutical companies rely on patent 
protection to recoup the cost of development and generate a profit.24  
A patent can guarantee the pharmaceutical company a 
monopoly on sales of the drug for the life of the patent. As with the 
agricultural biotechnology industry, patents cover a large array of 
inventions within the drug development process. For instance, 
patents protect active ingredients of a drug, manufacturing practices, 
as well as specialized uses of the drug.  
Due to increased regulation and the concomitant increased 
development cost, consumer prices of pharmaceuticals increased. 
Pharmaceutical companies command premium prices for patent-
protected drugs due to the monopoly power granted by the drug’s 
patent. Once the patent expires, other pharmaceutical companies may 
sell a drug previously covered by the patent. Once other companies 
enter the market selling the same drug, competition immediately 
drives down the price of the drug.25  
Unfortunately, generic drug companies initially had little 
incentive to invest in generic drug production. Before the Hatch–
Waxman Act, generic drug companies were required to submit the 
same amount of safety and efficacy data as the branded drug 
company did in the initial filing, thus bearing both the cost of clinical 
trials as well as the low selling price of drugs once competition 
began.26 Compounding the problem, patent protection prevented 
generic companies from beginning research on the generic form of a 
drug, resulting in a de facto patent extension.27 These concerns over 
the availability of cheap generics for consumers after patent 
expiration led Congress to enact the Hatch–Waxman Act.28  
The Hatch–Waxman Act created an abbreviated approval 
pathway by which generic drug manufacturers could gain FDA 
approval. Under Hatch–Waxman, a generic company can file an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) and take advantage of 
the data submitted by the patented drug manufacturer by submitting 
                                                 
 23. See Michael Hay et al., Clinical Development Success Rates for 
Investigational Drugs, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 40, 47 (2014). 
 24. Rebecca Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 350 (2007). 
 25. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its 
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 191 (1999). 
 26. Id. at 187. 
 27. See id.; Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 357. 
 28. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 
35, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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only data to establish that the branded drug and the generic drug to 
be marketed are bioequivalent.29 Obviously generation of this data 
requires use of the branded drug, an activity that would normally 
need permission from the patent owner if conducted during the 
patent term. 
Therefore, in response to the limitation of the common law 
experimental use exception in Roche, the Hatch–Waxman Act 
amended the patent laws to establish a statutory experimental use 
exception to patent infringement for research on the drug during the 
patent period.30 This statutory experimental use exception for generic 
drug companies resulted in quicker generic drug availability because 
research to establish bioequivalency is no longer an infringement of 
the patent protecting a branded drug. Consequently, consumers often 
are able to enjoy the benefit of generics on the day that the patent 
expires. This statutory experimental use exception has become a 
fundamental tenet of patent law for the pharmaceutical industry.  
The statutory experimental use exception is found in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1). Its language reads:  
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product 
(as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and 
the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using 
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other 
processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely 
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or 
sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.  
As applied to the pharmaceutical industry, the language of the 
statutory experimental use exception was read such that a “patented 
invention” is a patented drug—the “Federal Law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products”
is the provisions of the FDCA that cover the abbreviated approval 
process for generic drugs; and the use of the patented invention 
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information” is the bioequivalency studies necessary 
                                                
29. Id. § 101. Bioequivalency is defined as “the absence of a significant 
difference in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in 
pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the 
site of drug action when administered at the same molar dose under similar 
conditions in an appropriately designed study.” 21 CFR § 320.1(e) (2014). 
30. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).  
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for generic approval.31 While these interpretations make sense in the 
context of the development of the Hatch–Waxman Act of which the 
statutory experimental use exception is a part, the language itself is 
actually quite broad. These ambiguities in the language of the 
statutory experimental use exception have led to a line of cases 
expanding the application beyond merely its use in the development 
of generic drugs. However, the statutory experimental use exception 
is not without its limitations.  
B. Evolution of the Statutory Experimental Use Exception 
The narrow conception of the statutory experimental use 
exception as applying solely to generic drug development prevailed 
until the Supreme Court heard the case of Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic, Inc.32 At that time, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
application of the defense more broadly. Subsequent Supreme Court 
and Federal Circuit cases have further delineated the reach of the 
statutory experimental use exception as it applies to products other 
than generic drugs. 
In Eli Lilly, the patent infringement allegations were based on 
the use of patented technology to develop a new medical device 
rather than a generic drug.33 Like drugs, medical devices are also 
regulated under the FDCA,34 though medical device regulations for 
pre-market approval are found in 21 U.S.C. § 360(e) rather than 21 
U.S.C. § 355, which governs pre-market approval of drugs.  
The Eli Lilly analysis of the extension of the statutory 
experimental use exception to medical devices relied on 
interpretation of various words and phrases within the statute. The 
Court first determined that the words “patented invention” within 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) apply to all types of inventions rather than merely 
drug-related inventions.35 Secondly, the Eli Lilly Court interpreted 
the phrase “a Federal Law which regulates the manufacture, use, or 
sale of drugs or veterinary biological products”36 to include the entire 
statutory scheme of regulation by the FDCA.37  
                                                
31. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 675-76 (1990).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 661.  
34. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2012). 
35. Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 665. 
36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
37. Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 665-66. 
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While such a broad application of the statutory experimental 
use exception seems to open its application to any potentially patent-
infringing activities used in conjunction with any sort of FDA-
regulated product, the Court noted that potentially infringing uses are 
limited to those “reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under” the FDCA in order to qualify for 
the defense.38
Subsequently, a separate line of cases has dealt with the 
definition of “uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information” under the FDCA.39 While the Supreme 
Court’s initial interpretation of the statute was quite broad, later 
cases from the Federal Circuit have defined limits on the use of the 
defense.  
The leading Supreme Court case on the definition of uses that 
are “reasonably related” in the context of an FDA submission is 
Merck v. Integra.40 In Merck, research was conducted on patented 
peptides without knowing which, if any, peptide eventually would 
lead to an FDA submission.41 The Merck Court held this research to 
be sheltered by the statutory experimental use exception. Thus, 
preclinical research on patented inventions is protected under the 
statutory experimental use exception as long as there is a reasonable 
basis to believe that the invention could become part of a submission 
to the FDA—even if it is actually never so included.  
Again, the Supreme Court interpreted the application of the 
statute quite broadly. The Federal Circuit has followed that call for 
breadth in a number of ways. First, the Federal Circuit allowed the 
statutory experimental use exception to apply to the usage of the data 
resulting from the exempted infringement for non-FDA reporting 
purposes, but only so long as its initial research had originally been 
gathered via activities reasonably related to an FDA submission.42
More recently, the Federal Circuit approved of the application of the 
patent infringement defense in producing data for internal records 
                                                
38. Id. at 674 n.6. 
39. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
40. 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005). 
41. Id. at 199. 
42. See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc., No. 92-1076, 1993 
WL 87405, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Nexell Theraputics Inc., v. AmCell Corp., 143 F. 
Supp. 2d 407, 421-22 (D. Del. 2001). 
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that were required to be “readily available for authorized inspection” 
by the FDA at any time—even if the records were never inspected.43 
The Merck Court did foresee some limitation on the types of 
studies covered by the statutory experimental use exception. For 
instance, the Court noted that basic research designed for 
information rather than the “intent to develop” a drug would not be 
covered by the defense.44 Therefore, basic research institutions, such 
as universities and non-profits seeking to understand mechanisms of 
action rather than product development are unlikely to benefit from 
the statutory experimental use exception. Relying on Merck, the 
Federal Circuit held that the statutory experimental use exception 
does not apply to nonrequired, post-marketing infringing uses of a 
patented invention even if information is routinely reported to the 
FDA.45  
In addition to the line of cases regarding the term “reasonably 
related,” the Federal Circuit has also limited the application of the 
statutory experimental use exception in the context of infringing uses 
of research tools. In Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 
the Federal Circuit held that patented research tools that were not 
themselves subject to regulation by the FDA could not avail 
themselves of the statutory use exception.46 For example, Innova’s 
device, used to measure the rate of a drug delivery product, was not 
FDA regulated, and thus the statutory experimental use exception did 
not apply—even though the drug delivery product was FDA 
regulated.47 District courts have followed Proveris for molecular 
biology inventions used as research tools. For example, patented 
antisense nucleic acid molecules used to identify target molecules48 
and cloned receptors used to identify drug candidates49 have been 
held to be research tools not eligible for shelter under the statutory 
experimental use exception.  
As with the pharmaceutical industry, the agricultural 
biotechnology industry uses many of the same scientific techniques, 
                                                 
 43. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 44. Merck, 545 U.S. at 205-06. 
 45. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1070 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 46. 536 F.3d 1256, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Isis Pharm., Inc. v. Santaris Pharma A/S Corp., No. 11CV02214 BTM 
(KSC), 2012 WL 4111157, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2012). 
 49. PSN Ill., LLC v. Abbott Labs., No. 09C5879, 2011 WL 4442825, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2011). 
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faces similar challenges, and is subject to FDA regulation under the 
FDCA. The breadth of the application of the statutory experimental 
use exception along with its specific limitations will determine the 
value of patents in the agricultural biotechnology industry. But to 
understand the application and limitations of the statutory 
experimental use exception in agricultural biotechnology, it is first 
necessary to understand the industry, its patent strategy, and its 
regulation.  
 II. AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY: REGULATION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION  
The agricultural biotechnology industry has experienced 
explosive growth over the past thirty years.50 As described in Section 
III, intellectual property protection of living organisms and the 
insertion of foreign genes into plants both began in the early 1980s. 
Like the pharmaceutical industry, the agricultural biotechnology 
industry must comply with complicated regulations and relies on 
patent protection to recoup expense from GE crop development. The 
patent strategy of the agricultural biotechnology industry, like the 
pharmaceutical industry strategy, focuses on patenting several 
different aspects of GE crops and their production. 
A. Developing and Regulating Genetically Engineered Crops 
In the mid-nineteenth century, Gregor Mendel studied how 
traits, which are observable characteristics of an organism such as 
flower coloration, pass from one generation to the next in pea 
plants.51 His groundbreaking experiments began to reveal the rules of 
heredity.52 Almost one hundred years later, scientists would 
determine that DNA was the molecule that carried the information 
                                                 
 50. For a full description of the history and regulation of the agricultural 
biotechnology industry, see Ritalin to RoundUp, supra note 7. 
 51. Experiments in Plant Hybridization (1865), MENDELWEB, 
http://www.mendelweb.org/Mendel.html (last visited July 6, 2015). Gregor Johann 
Mendel (1822-1884) experimented on pea plant heredity between 1856 and 1863. 
Edward Edelson, Gregor Mendel and the Roots of Genetics, in OXFORD PORTRAITS 
IN SCIENCE 99, 99-100 (1999). 
 52. See Daniel L. Hartl & Vitezslav Orel, What Did Gregor Mendel Think 
He Discovered?, 131 GENETICS 245, 245 (1992). 
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resulting in these traits and that specific segments of DNA known as 
genes determine the observed traits of an organism.53 
By the 1970s, scientists had discovered the base knowledge and 
developed the first generation of tools needed for direct manipulation 
of DNA, a set of technologies known as recombinant DNA 
technology.54 Recombinant DNA technology would quickly make its 
way into use in plants55 and would eventually lead to the first 
commercial GE crop approved by the FDA—a GE tomato with a 
longer shelf life than conventionally developed tomatoes.56 GE crops 
designed to be herbicide resistant or resistant to insect pests were 
developed shortly thereafter.57 Today, nearly 90% of all soybeans 
and corn grown in the United States are genetically engineered.58 
Genetically engineered crops are regulated under a regulatory 
scheme known as the Coordinated Framework.59 The Coordinated 
Framework rests on the underlying premise that GE crops developed 
through biotechnology are not fundamentally different from those 
crops developed using more conventional breeding techniques.60 
Therefore, existing regulations would be sufficient for regulation of 
GE crops. The Framework regulates these GE crops by relying on 
three main agencies: the FDA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
                                                 
 53. See, e.g., Oswald T. Avery, Colin M. MacLeod & Maclyn McCarty, 
Studies on the Chemical Nature of the Substance Inducing Transformation of 
Pneumococcal Types: Induction of Transformation by a Desoxyribonucleic Acid 
Fraction Isolated from Pneumococcus Type III, 79 J. EXPERIMENTAL MED. 137, 156 
(1944); see Maclyn McCarty, Discovering Genes are Made of DNA, 421 NATURE 
406 (2003). 
 54. Ritalin to RoundUp, supra note 7, at 12 & n.40, 13 & n.41. 
 55. See e.g., Robert T. Fraley et. al., Expression of Bacterial Genes in Plant 
Cells, 80 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 4803 (1983). 
 56. See Agency Summary Memorandum Re: Consultation with Calgene, 
Inc., Concerning FLAVR SAVR™ Tomatoes, FDA (May 17, 1994), 
http://www.fda.gov/food/foodscienceresearch/biotechnology/submissions/ucm22504
3.htm#out20. 
 57. See, e.g., Recent Trends in GE Adoption, USDA, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-
the-us/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption.aspx (last updated July 14, 2014). 
 58. See id. 
 59. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 
23302-93 (June 26, 1986). For a full description of the Coordinated Framework, see 
PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, GUIDE TO U.S. REGULATION OF 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 
(2004), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/ 
wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/food_and_biotechnology/hhsbiotech0901pdf.pdf 
[hereinafter PEW].  
 60. See PEW, supra note 59.  
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Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS), and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).61 A single product is 
often regulated by more than one agency.  
Acting under the authority of the FDCA, the FDA regulates the 
safety of agricultural biotechnology for consumption.62 In its 1992 
Statement of Policy, the FDA clarified its interpretation of the 
application of the FDCA as it pertains to GE crops.63 This policy 
basically provided that GE crops would be regulated as food 
additives under the Act.64 However, GE crops are usually considered 
to be generally recognized as safe (GRAS) and, as such, much of the 
compliance with consultations and other FDA submissions are 
considered voluntary.65 In spite of the technically voluntary nature of 
the regulations, developers of GE crops comply with the regulations 
to the extent that all GE crops that have gone through the mandatory 
USDA-APHIS review have also gone through the FDA voluntary 
process.66 
Like pharmaceuticals, these regulations are complicated, and 
the studies to create the GE crops and to develop the data for 
regulatory submissions require long-lines and millions of dollars. As 
a result, the agricultural biotechnology industry relies on patent 
protection to recoup costs in much the same way as the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
B. Protecting Intellectual Property in Genetically Engineered Crops 
Coinciding with the advancement of biotechnology, the 
industry building around GE crops was also assisted by changes in 
intellectual property law, allowing greater protection of crop plants. 
In 1930, the Plant Patent Act allowed for a type of patent protection 
of asexually reproduced plants.67 However, most food-crop plants are 
sexually reproduced and thus not eligible subject matter for a plant 
patent of this type.68 Over the next four decades, changes in the 
                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 379dd (2012). 
 63. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 22984 (May 29, 1992). 
 64. Id. 
 65. PEW, supra note 59, at 20. 
 66. Nathanael Johnson, The GM Safety Dance: What’s Rule and What’s 
Real, GRIST (July 10, 2013), http://grist.org/food/the-gm-safety-dance-whats-rule-
and-whats-real/. 
 67. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2012). 
 68. §§ 161-164. Section 161 reads: 
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understanding of trait transmission in plants led Congress to pass the 
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA),69 which extended 
patent-like protection for sexually reproduced plants, including most 
crop plants.70 However, the PVPA contained exemptions for 
research71 and for seed saving,72 making the intellectual property 
rights awarded by a PVPA certificate less valuable than rights that 
would be obtained if plants could be patentable subject matter for 
utility patents.  
Originally, utility patents generally were not issued for living 
organisms.73 However, along with the development and growth of 
biotechnology, the idea of utility patent protection for living 
organisms such as GE crops was also evolving during this time. The 
Supreme Court first examined the issue of utility patent protection 
for living things in 1980 with the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.74  
The Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty determined 
that a live, but human-made, bacterium was patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. §101.75 The Chakrabarty Court rejected the idea that 
man-made living things are products of nature and thus not 
patentable under 35 U.S.C. §101.76 Five years later, the U.S. Patent 
                                                                                                       
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and 
new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and 
newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant 
found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.  
§ 161. 
 69. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 70. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541, 2544 (2012). 
 71. § 2544 (“The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant 
breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement . . . .”); see 
also Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection 
Act in Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 133 (2005). 
 72. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2012) (“[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a 
person to save seed produced by the person from seed obtained, or descended from 
seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use 
such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of the person . . . .”). 
 73. Ritalin to RoundUp, supra note 7, at 16; see also James Ming Chen, An 
Agricultural Law Jeremiad: The Harvest Is Past, the Summer Is Ended, and Seed Is 
Not Saved, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 235, 244 (discussing the reliance on trade secret 
protection by plant developers). 
 74. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1980). 
 75. Id. at 309-10. 
 76. Id. at 310-11. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
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and Trademark Office (USPTO) adopted the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning and expanded utility patent protection to transgenic plants 
as well as microorganisms.77 In 2001, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the USPTO’s granting of utility patent protection to GE plants.78 
During this time period, the agricultural biotechnology industry, then 
in its infancy, began to patent various aspects of the development of 
GE crops, including the genes coding for traits, methods for inserting 
genes, and the final genetically modified crops.79  
Utility patents can cover an extremely wide variety of 
inventions. 35 U.S.C. § 101 informs us that patentable subject matter 
includes any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.”80 This wide concept of patentable subject matter has 
allowed players within the agricultural biotechnology industry to 
gain valuable patents covering gene constructs, GE plants, and 
research tools. 
An example of a utility patent from the agricultural 
biotechnology field can be found in U.S. Patent No. 6,537,756 
(ތ756), a patent directed at the invention of an insecticidal protein 
called CryET29 produced by a gene isolated from the Bacillus 
thuringiensis bacteria.81 Claim 1 of the ތ756 patent covers the 
isolated DNA sequence of the CryET29 gene as well as minor 
alterations of that gene, which would still produce an insecticidal 
protein.82 The ތ756 patent also claims shorter portions of the gene 
                                                                                                       
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 77. See Ex parte Hibberd, 1985 WL 71986 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985) (ruling 
that plants could be proper subject matter for a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101 even 
though the same may be protected under the Plant Patent Act or the Plant Variety 
Protection Act). 
 78. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 
(2001). 
 79. John H. Barton, Acquiring Protection for Improved Germplasm and 
Inbred Lines, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 23, 24 (F.H. Erbisch & K.M. Maredia eds., 2004). 
 80. § 101. 
 81. U.S. Patent No. 6,537,756 (filed Jul. 6, 2000). 
 82. Id. at col. 54 ll. 52-57 (“A purified nucleic acid segment consisting of 
the nucleic acid complement of SEQ ID NO:1 or a sequence encoding an 
insecticidally active protein which hybridizes to the sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 
under stringent hybridization conditions comprising about 0.02M to about 0.15M 
NaCl and temperatures of about 50° C. to about 70° C.”). 
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sequence83 and the use of the claimed gene within another nucleic 
acid construct.84 Also claimed is the ability to insert the CryET29 
gene into another organism.85 Further claims specifically identify 
these organisms as including other types of bacteria86 or a plant87 
such as corn, wheat, or a fruit tree.88 By gaining a patent with these 
claims, the patent owner has obtained intellectual property rights 
allowing the owner to exclude others from (1) isolating the CryET29 
gene or a relatively short portion of that gene; (2) using the CryET29 
gene in a nucleic acid construct such as a plasmid; and (3) using the 
CryET29 gene to create almost any type of GE organism.89  
However, the recent Supreme Court decision in Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc.90 has narrowed the 
ability of inventors to claim some gene sequences by limiting the 
definition of patentable subject matter in living organisms.91 
Specifically, Myriad addressed whether isolated DNA sequences of 
naturally occurring genes were patentable subject matter.92 The Court 
held that merely isolating genes, i.e., removing a DNA sequence 
from its normal environment of the organism’s genome, does not 
make them patentable subject matter.93 An isolated DNA sequence 
that matches a sequence found in an organism is not patentable 
subject matter as it is found in nature.94 The Myriad holding may 
have significant impact on patent protection of the genes underlying 
the valuable traits used in GE crops. 
                                                 
 83. See id. at col. 54 ll. 62-64 (“An isolated nucleic acid segment consisting 
of at least a forty-five basepair contiguous nucleic acid sequence from SEQ ID 
NO:1.”).  
 84. See id. at col. 55 ll. 1-7. “The nucleic acid segment of claim 2, further 
comprising a recombinant vector.” ތ756 Patent at col. 55 ll. 1-2. 
 85. See id. at col. 55 ll. 8-9 (“A recombinant host cell comprising the 
nucleic acid segment of claim 2.”). 
 86. See id. at col. 55 ll. 14-16 (“The recombinant host cell of claim 12, 
wherein said bacterial cell is an E. coli, B. thuringiensis, B. subtilis, B. megaterium, 
or a Pseudomonas spp. cell.”). 
 87. See id. at col. 55 ll. 21-22 (“The recombinant host cell of claim 15, 
further defined as a plant cell.”). 
 88. Id. at col. 55 ll. 23-25 (“The recombinant host cell of claim 16, wherein 
said plant cell is a corn, wheat, turf grass, potato, vegetable, ornamental, or fruit tree 
cell.”). 
 89. Id. at col. 4 ll. 1-11.  
 90. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013). 
 91. Id. at 2111, 2120.  
 92. Id. at 2111.  
 93. Id. at 2117-18. 
 94. Id. at 2111.  
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Under Myriad, naturally occurring gene sequences such as the 
CryET29 gene claimed in the ތ756 patent are no longer patentable 
subject matter even when isolated from the original genome. 
However, the Myriad court also held that cDNA, a relatively minor 
laboratory alteration of a gene’s sequence, was patentable subject 
matter because that altered sequence differs from the sequence found 
in nature.95 The Myriad holding suggests that relatively minor 
alterations to otherwise naturally occurring genes may allow those 
genes to be patentable subject matter.96 Future court decisions may 
well use this reasoning to hold that alterations to a naturally 
occurring gene, such as adding promoter and enhancer sequences,97 
placement into a specific vector, or the removal of portions of the 
gene sequence, render the altered DNA sequence patentable subject 
matter. Therefore, in the ތ756 patent, the claims directed specifically 
at the isolated CryET29 gene would be unlikely to be upheld under 
Myriad, but the use of the CryET29 gene in other nucleic acid 
constructs and the use of the gene in creating GE crops are likely to 
remain patentable subject matter. 
Also commonly observed in the agricultural biotechnology 
field are patents directed at research tools. Research tools are 
inventions with which companies conduct research rather than 
inventions on which research is conducted.  
One of the most widely used research tools over the last few 
decades is the method of inserting foreign DNA into plant cells (a 
process known as transformation) using Agrobacterium. There are 
numerous patents associated with this basic technology and 
improvements on it. One such patent is U.S. Patent No. 6,603,061 
(ތ061), which is directed towards an improvement on 
Agrobacterium-mediated transformation of plant cells in which an 
antibiotic is used on the cells to prevent too many copies of the 
foreign DNA from being inserted.98 Claim 4 specifically covers an 
                                                 
 95. Id. at 2119.  
 96. Id. at 2112, 2119. While the Myriad Court declared cDNA to be 
patentable subject matter, the other requirements for obtaining a patent—novelty, 
non-obviousness, and utility—still apply. Given the routine nature of cDNA 
conversion in modern laboratories, the non-obviousness of recent cDNA patents 
may be in question. 
 97. Promoter and enhancer regions are involved with controlling 
transcription of a gene, which is the first step performed in the cell toward producing 
a protein such as the CryET29 protein. 
 98. U.S. Patent No. 6,603,061 col. 40 ll. 31-52. Claim 4 of ތ061 reads: 
A method of transforming a plant cell or plant tissue using an 
Agrobacterium mediated process comprising the steps of: 
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Agrobacterium-mediated transformation of a dicotyledonous variety 
of plant in which an antibiotic is used, followed by culturing the 
transformed cells and growing plants from them. Research tool 
inventions are important because they are the tools by which 
products are created. 
 III. LIMITATIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY 
EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION IN THE AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY  
Although I argue that the statutory experimental use exception 
should apply to the agricultural biotechnology industry in a separate 
Article,99 it is important to recognize that, as in the pharmaceutical 
industry, there are limitations as to what will be covered by the 
defense to patent infringement. Specifically, research conducted for 
non-FDA activities and using patented research tools may not be 
eligible for the defense. These limitations to the statutory 
experimental use exception will allow the patents to retain real value 
for the companies who invested in the creation of the patented 
inventions. 
A. Research Conducted for Submission to Other Agencies 
Like pharmaceuticals, GE crops are regulated by the FDA—
and it is this regulation that is the basis for my arguments as to why 
the statutory experimental use exception should apply to the 
                                                                                                       
 
inoculating a transformable plant cell or tissue from a dicotyledonous 
plant with Agrobacterium containing at least one genetic component 
capable of being transferred to the plant cell or tissue in an inoculation 
media containing an effective amount of at least one antibiotic that inhibits 
or suppresses the growth of Agrobacterium;  
 
co-culturing the transformable plant cell or tissue after the inoculating step 
in a medium capable of supporting growth of plant cells or tissue 
expressing the genetic component, said medium not containing said 
antibiotic;  
 
selecting transformed plant cells or tissue; and  
 
regenerating a transformed plant expressing the genetic component from 
the selected transformed plant cells or tissue. 
Id. 
 99. Ritalin to RoundUp, supra note 7.  
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agricultural biotechnology industry. However, unlike 
pharmaceuticals, GE crops are regulated under a Coordinated 
Framework that involves the FDA, USDA, and EPA working 
together to regulate different aspects of the crop for production.100  
Due to this tri-agency regulatory scheme, the developer of a 
new GE crop will conduct potentially infringing uses to develop 
submissions for the USDA or the EPA in addition to the FDA. The 
statutes underlying the USDA and EPA portions of the Coordinated 
Framework generally have no such statutory experimental use 
exception for patent infringement.101 
Thus, while the Telectronics Court clarified that the statute 
allows data produced under the statutory experimental use exception 
to be also used for non-FDA reporting purposes,102 experiments 
designed solely to comply with mandatory USDA or EPA 
regulations would infringe any applicable patents. It would likely be 
extremely difficult for a GE crop developer to design all experiments 
such that all infringing activities are directed in some manner toward 
FDA regulations since the USDA and EPA have widely varying 
requirements directed at issues other than food safety. Additionally, 
to avoid infringement liability, companies would be required to 
prove that each and every experiment or field trial was conducted to 
gather data to be submitted to the FDA. Keeping track of these 
resultant agency submittals would be a logistical nightmare. If an 
experiment failed to be conducted to create data for submission to 
the FDA, then the company would be liable for patent infringement. 
The potential for confusion would increase the cost of research 
oversight and the risk of patent infringement liability. 
B. Research Conducted Using Patented Research Tools 
Another limitation to the statutory experimental use exception 
that would be important for the value of patents in the agricultural 
biotechnology industry is the research tool limitation. As in the 
pharmaceutical industry, protecting research tools incentivizes 
companies to invest in developing tools for creating new GE crops. 
                                                 
 100. For a full description of the Coordinated Framework, see PEW, supra 
note 59. 
 101. Though some of the EPA regulatory power is based in the FDCA. See 
Carter-Johnson, supra note 7, for comments pertaining to expansion of the statutory 
use exception beyond FDA regulations. 
 102. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1524 
(1992). 
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The Proveris holding restricting the application of the statutory 
experimental use exception from research tools will yield a broad 
base of protection for the industry.103  
Research tools, such as the methods to create GE crops covered 
by the ތ061 patent, are not regulated by the FDA.104 Patent protection 
for methods of creation allows companies monopolies far upstream 
in the research spectrum. Because the statutory experimental use 
exception would not be available as a defense for infringement of the 
patents protecting these research tools, competitors would be forced 
to license the patented research tools or invent new methods to insert 
the gene of interest into the crop to be produced. Thus, the value of 
these patents would be retained even if the statutory experimental 
use exception applied to the industry.  
Additionally, many of the same types of molecular biology 
research tools used by the pharmaceutical industry, such as antisense 
nucleic acids and receptors, will be important in research underlying 
the determination of which genetic modifications will be most 
important in a given crop. Because courts have previously held that 
the statutory research exception does not apply to these types of 
research tools,105 competitors will again need to license the patents to 
use these tools to develop new products. Furthermore, it is likely 
nucleic acid constructs such as those claimed in the ތ756 patent 
would be considered research tools if the plasmid is not found in the 
final regulated genetically modified crop but rather is used in its 
production. In each case, the research tool patent would retain much 
of the valuation it had before the implementation of the statutory 
experimental use exception in the agricultural biotechnology 
industry.  
CONCLUSION 
As the patents surrounding the initial agricultural 
biotechnology crops are expiring, interest will turn to generic 
versions of crops, much like drugs. The Hatch–Waxman Act is one 
model for development of a generic industry. Therefore, as we think 
about whether Hatch–Waxman-izing the agricultural biotechnology 
                                                 
 103. Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1265 
(2008).  
 104. See, e.g., id.  
 105. See Isis Pharm., Inc. v. Santaris Pharma A/S Corp., No. 11CV02214 
BTM (KSC), 2012 WL 4111157 (S.D. Cal. 2012); PSN Ill., LLC v. Abbott Labs., 
No. 09 C 5879, 2011 WL 4442825 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
530 Michigan State Law Review  2015:509 
industry is appropriate, consideration should be given to what impact 
the application of the statutory experimental use exception would 
have on the industry. This Article on the limitations of the statutory 
experimental use exception complements my longer discussion as to 
why the defense should apply in the agricultural biotechnology 
industry. In short, patents in the industry would still retain much 
value in the event the statutory experimental use exception is 
applied. 
